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Abstract 
In the last few decades the influence on economics of the ideas of T. Kuhn and I. Lakatos 
was considerable. The increasing use of terms like “paradigms” and “scientific research 
programmes”  in almost every field of economics, is indicative of the influence of these two 
philosophers. Furthermore, the introduction of the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos in economics 
gave the stimulus for work on the nature of growth of economic knowledge. The paper  
starts  by  presenting  the  main  influence  of  T.  Kuhn  on  theories  concerned  with  the 
evolution of economic theory. It continues with a review of the main criticisms regarding 
the appropriateness and applicability of Kuhnian ideas for economics. The same approach 
is followed in the case of I. Lakatos. After a classification and  discussion of the main 
findings, the paper attempts to offer an interpretation of the general impact of these two 
philosophers science on ideas relating to   the development of economic theories. 
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I. Introduction 
Until  the  1970’s  the  dominant  methodological  views  among  the  vast  majority  of 
economists were based on  the philosophy of logical positivism. In particular, they were 
content to follow the so-called hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation, which 
emerged in the beginning of the century mainly from the work of the Vienna circle (Blaug, 
1980, pp.1-4, Caldwell, 1982, pp.11-18). These ideas were brought in economics mainly by   
T. Hutchison (1938). A clear indication of the powerful influence of positivism in economics 
was  the  great  popularity  of  the  term  “positive”  among  economists  which became widely 
known mainly from M. Friedman’s (1953) work on economic method. Although Friedman’s 
argument  was  rooted  in  economics  rather  than  philosophy,  it  summarized  the  “mature 
positivist“ approach   (Backhouse, 1994, p.182 and Caldwell, 1982, p.173). However, in the 
last few decades the influence of post-positivist philosophers of science  (Popper, Kuhn, 
Lakatos,  etc)  became  significant.  More  specifically,  there  was  an  increasing  number  of 
methodological works in economics that were critical of the traditional approach and also 
reflected the post-positivist spirit (see Redman, 1993, Dow, 2002).  
It can be argued that the work of Popper gave the initial momentum to the gradual  
undermining of the positivist approaches (see, e.g. Caldwell, 1982). Thus, in this sense, it 
provided  the  ground  for  the  subsequent  growth  of  the  ideas  of  Kuhn  and  Lakatos  in 
economics.  (One  can  note  here  that  it  was  Latsis’  1976  book  which  stimulated    further  
economists’ interest in post-positivist philosophies of science)*
*. The influence of  Popper is 
still quite substantial. However, the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos gave the stimulus for work on 
the nature of growth of economic knowledge. In other words, they made economists think 
                     
*We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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about the way that  economic ideas develop. The increasing use of terms like Kuhnian 
paradigms  and  Lakatosian  research  programmes    indicates  the  influence  of  these 
philosophers  on  the  formation  of  ideas  about  the  development  of  economic  theory. 
Furthermore, the substantial growth of the relevant literature is another indication of  the 
previous point (see for instance the volume by de Marchi and Blaug, 1991). 
In  the recent years however, the influence of Kuhn and Lakatos among economic 
methodologists  seems  to  have  weakened.  In  particular,  various  forms  of  naturalism, 
pragmatism  and  constructivism  are  gaining  popularity.  Furthermore,  science  studies  and 
cultural  history  are  viewed  more  appropriate  as  tools  for  the  historical  reconstruction  of 
economics (for a comprehensive treatment of the new currents in economic methodology, 
see Hands, 2001). In spite of this, a great number of economists continue to employ Kuhnian 
or Lakatosian modes of methodological explanation in almost all fields of economics. One 
can  find  recent  examples  from  the  theory  of  choice  (List,  2004),  monetary  economics 
(Bofinger  and  Wollmershauser,  2003),  development  economics  (Fine,  2002),  law  and 
economics  (Krecke,  2003),  market  equilibrium  (De  Vroey,  2001),  health  economics 
(Edwards,  2001),  economic  fluctuations  (Louca,  2001).  This  implies  that  in  spite  of  the 
relative decline among methodologists,  these ideas are still influential among practicing 
economists. Thus, it seems that  a critical survey of the influence of these two philosophers of 
science on the economic methodology might be useful for the appropriateness of use of 
Kuhnian and Lakatosian concepts in economics and for the further  understanding of  their 
continuing influence on economics in general. Furthermore, this survey will attempt to update 
older surveys by  examining recent uses of  Kuhnian and Lakatosian concepts. 
Given the above, the paper will start with a presentation of the main influence of  T. 
Kuhn  as  is  found  in  influential  works.  The  next  section  will  concentrate  on  the  main   4
criticisms  concerning  the  appropriateness  and  applicability  of  Kuhn’s  influence  on  the 
history of economics. The same approach is followed in the case of I. Lakatos. After a 
classification  and    discussion  of  the  main  findings,  the  paper  attempts  to  offer  an 
interpretation of the general impact of these two philosophers of science on ideas relating 
to   the development of economic thought . 
 
II. The Influence of Thomas Kuhn 
The basic ideas of Kuhn can be found in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” 
(1970). Very briefly, according to Kuhn a given “paradigm” guides the scientific community. 
The  concept  of  paradigm  implies  a  general  theoretical  viewpoint  that  members  of  the 
community share (Subsequently, Kuhn replaced this concept with “disciplinary matrices” for 
reasons of clarity). Scientific revolutions occur because the established paradigm faces a 
scientific crisis which occurs because of  accumulation of anomalies or unsolved scientific 
puzzles.  Gradually,  a  new  paradigm  becomes  dominant.    The  revolutionary  period  is 
characterized by “extraordinary  science” while non revolutionary periods are characterized 
by “normal science”. It has to be noted that this process has psychological rather than a 
rational  basis  and  this  is  the  basic  reason  why  there  is  what  Kuhn  calls  the 
incommensurability  problem  between  competing  paradigms.  Subsequently,  Kuhn  moved 
from a psychological explanation of incommensurability to one based in the philosophy of 
language (see Bird, 2002 and for a detailed discussion of Kuhn’s ideas, see Kuhn, 1970, 
2000; Redman, 1993 and Dow, 2002).  
Within  the  first  few  years  after  the  appearance  of  “The  Structure  of  Scientific 
Revolutions” (first edition, 1962), a  number of economists attempted to explain the growth of 
economic knowledge by following Kuhn’s ideas. Thus, a representative example of a general   5
application of Kuhn’s scheme is  Kunin and Weaver (1971) who believe that of all social 
sciences, economics is more appropriate for the application of Kuhnian ideas. The strong 
theoretical consensus that is observed in economics, is the main reason for this. However, 
the authors caution that the level of generality at which a paradigm is defined is important for 
its successful application. Furthermore, the concept of paradigm change is more complex 
and subtle in economics, since not only our views concerning economic phenomena change 
but also the phenomena themselves.   
Historians of economics have applied  the Kuhnian approach not only to mainstream, 
but  also  to  radical  economics.  The  notion  of  Kuhnian  paradigm  as  applied  to  radical 
economics was  the central theme of a special issue of the Review of Radical Economics in 
1971.  The  main  point  was  that  the  Kuhnian  approach  in  a  wide  sense,  is  useful  in 
understanding  the  development  of  economic  thought  (e.g.  Sweezy,  1971,  Zweig,1971). 
Similarly, Eichner and Kregel (1975) argued that Post-Keynesian theory constitutes a new 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. 
As was noted, the Kuhnian analysis of the nature of  scientific process has two main 
components: (a)  regarding the nature and the rate of progress of the discipline  itself, namely 
if it is on a paradigmatic level; and (b) the existence of scientific revolutions in a specific 
science. In the coming pages we will explore if  these  characteristics of the Kuhnian analysis 
have found fruitful grounds in economics.  
  In regard to the paradigmatic level of economics,  the historians of economics started 
as early as in the mid  1960’s  to investigate the presence of Kuhnian  paradigms. Gordon’s 
(1965) article was the first one to apply  Kuhn’s paradigmatic process in  economics. Gordon  
(1965, pp. 123-4) argued  that the ruling paradigm in economics is Smith’s postulate of the 
maximizing individual in a free market environment. Since then, a number  of historians of   6
economic  thought  tried  to  fit    the  Kuhnian  approach  to  the  development  of  economics. 
However,    the  first  example  of  the  systematic  application  of  Kuhn’s  views  to  economic 
thought can be found in Coats  (1969). Coats applied Kuhn’s methodological tools to the 
history  of  economic  thought.  His  main  conclusion  was  that  there  has  been  only  one 
paradigm:  equilibrium theory based on the idea of market mechanism. Some years later,  
Loasby (1971) argued that there exists the profit-maximization paradigm in economics, while 
an emerging paradigm could be the behavioural theory of the firm.  
The next systematic application of Kuhnian views was provided by B. Ward (1972). 
He adopts some of Kuhn’s criteria in order to examine if economics can be characterised 
as a mature science much like physics. His reference is the orthodox neoclassical theory. 
In  his  view,    the  existence  of  an  “invisible  college”  of  neoclassical  economists  with 
common method and agreement concerning what are the important  problems of the field, 
indicate the maturity of neoclassical economics. Furthermore, he continues to find puzzle-
solving behaviour giving as a prime example of the classical versus the marginalist theory 
of value. Apart from the Neoclassical school,  Ward examines the development of Marxian 
economics. He discerns some puzzle-solving behaviour especially with regard to the issue 
of values and prices. However, he believes that it fits less to the Kuhnian framework since 
he is unable to  find examples of crises and scientific revolutions. As he writes “[Marxism] 
passes most of the tests necessary for a Marxist economic science to exist in the Kuhnian 
test, but in practice it has failed because of the virtual absence of an  integrated social 
system of scientists oriented toward the systematic development of  the science through 
study of problems of detail” (1972, p. 70).  
Dow (1981) claimed that general equilibrium analysis must rather be considered as a 
Kuhnian paradigm. A few years later and in more general terms, Dow (1985) uses Kuhnian   7
analysis  for  macroeconomic  schools  of  thought  such  as  Mainstream,  Post  Keynesian, 
Marxian and Neo-Austrian. Even more recently, G. Argyrous (1992) writes  that with certain 
modifications  the  concept  of  paradigm  (or  disciplinary  matrices,  Kuhn’s  subsequently 
substitute term) can explain to a great extent the historical development of the  Neoclassical 
consumption function. Dobson (1994, p. 76) argued that financial economic theory of the firm 
shows a paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense but he does not adequately analyses its specific 
characteristics. A more recent application of  Kuhnian approach is to be found in a study of 
the  philosophical  foundations  of  transaction  cost  economics.  Following  Kuhnian 
methodology,  Miller  (1993)  believes  that    this  field  serves  a  puzzle-solving  role  for 
neoclassical economics and thus it can not be considered as new-institutional economics but 
part of the orthodox school.  The above discussion is summarized in table 1a and table 1b: 
 
Table  1a. 
 
Schools of Economic Thought and Kuhnian Paradigms  
Classical  Neoclassical  Radical/ Post-Keynesian 
Gordon, 1965  Coats, 1969  Eichner and Kregel, 1975 
  Dow, 1985  Dow, 1985 
  Gordon, 1965  Sweezy, 1971 
  Miller, 1993  Zweig, 1971 
  Ward, 1972   
 
Table 1b 
 
Economic Theories as Kuhnian Paradigms 
General Equilibrium  Theory of the Firm  Consumption Function 
Coats, 1969  Loasby, 1971  Argyrous, 1992 
Dow, 1981  Dobson,1994     8
 
 
  As was mentioned, the second important characteristic of the Kuhnian analysis is the 
emergence of a scientific revolution. There are historians who argued that  Kuhnian- type 
revolution emerged in economics. More specifically, Coats (1969) after presenting the main 
propositions  of  a  Kuhnian  revolution  pointed  out  that  there  was  only  one  revolution  in 
economics sharing Kuhnian features, that of the Keynesian Revolution. In another paper 
Coats (1972, pp. 308-314), more strongly than Blaug (1972, p. 277) who conceived the 
marginal revolution as “a gradual transformation”, recognized some Kuhnian elements of  this 
revolution in economics. 
1  
Ward  also  identifies  the  presence  of  scientific  revolutions.  He  believes  that 
Keynesianism constitutes a scientific revolution although not in the strict sense that Kuhn 
uses  the  expression.  Furthermore,  by  using  extensively  the  Kuhnian  paradigm  shift 
methodology,  showed  that another revolution in the 20
th century was that of “the formalist 
revolution” (Ward, 1972, p. 40). 
2  The view that Keynes’ theory constitutes a “scientific 
revolution  in  the  Kuhnian  sense  is  shared  by  other  economists  apart  from  Ward.  For 
instance, Winch (1969), Mehta (1974, 1979), Dillard (1978), Stanfield (1974), Leijonhufvud 
(1976) argue that the Keynesian revolution is a good example of a Kuhnian revolution in 
the  field  of  economics.  In  the  same  spirit  (although  not  with  regard  to  the  Keynesian 
revolution), O’Brien (1976, p. 103) considers that Kuhn’s system is  “for economists, a 
much more illuminating way of looking at their subject than that supplied by Popper”. Then, 
he maintains (1976, p. 105) that the marginal revolution is a case of paradigm change from 
the classical economy. In the same spirit, but much more recently, Schabas implies that  
Jevons’  ideas  were  revolutionary  for  economics  and  this  can  be  explained  in  Kuhnian 
terms (Schabas, 1990, pp.5, 23).    9
More recently, the idea of a Kuhnian type explanation has reappeared in connection 
to Keynesian macroeconomics. In particular, McGovern (1995) argues that the failure to 
find Lakatosian novel facts in Keynesian macroeconomics must  lead to the adoption of a 
Kuhnian type investigation. As is seen from table 2 most of historians of economics identify  
the existence of the Keynesian revolution and secondly of the marginalist. 
Table 2 
 
Kuhnian revolutions 
Keynesian   Marginalist  Formalist 
Coats, 1969  Coats, 1972  Ward, 1972 
Dillard, 1978  O’Brien, 1976   
Leijonhufvud, 1976  Schabas, 1990   
McGovern, 1995     
Mehta, 1974, 1979     
Stanfield, 1974     
Ward, 1972     
Winch, 1969     
 
 
 
 
III. Criticisms of Kuhn  
Apart from the positive influence of Kuhn, the application of his ideas to economics 
has also generated critical discussion and controversy. A significant number of economists 
were attracted to his views in late sixties, however, almost in the same period there were the 
first  criticisms.  There  were  two  main  lines  of  criticism:  (a)  the  vagueness  of  Kuhnian  
terminology; and (b) its non-appropriateness for the explanation of economic progress. Let us 
see the first line  of criticism.     10
  The first general criticism has to do with  what constitutes a  Kuhnian paradigm or a 
revolution in economic thought. For instance, Stigler (1969) was one of the first economists to 
cast serious doubts on the applicability of Kuhn’s schema in economics given the loose 
definition of the concept of paradigm. He criticized the imprecision of  Kuhn’s definition of the 
term  paradigm  and  argued  that  this  is  an  obstacle  for  its  testing  in  economics.  As  he 
comments  (1969, p. 225): “My main quarrel with Kuhn is over his failure to specify the nature 
of a paradigm in sufficient detail that his central thesis can be tested empirically”. This has led 
a number of economists to find the terms not only vague but confusing for the understanding 
of  the  history  of  the  discipline.  For  example,    Blaug  (1976,  p.  149)  maintains  that  term 
paradigm  should  be  “banished  from  economic  literature,  unless  surrounded  by  inverted 
commas”.  The same view is adopted by Redman (1993, p. 144) who believes that this 
terminology acts not to clarify but serves, rather, to obscure the issues. The imprecision and 
vagueness of  this Kuhnian term has also been pointed out by Johnson (1983), and  Glass 
and Johnson (1989, p.164).  It has to be noted though, that there are methodologists who do 
not think that vagueness is necessarily a negative characteristic (e.g. Dow, 1985).  
The  second    line  of  criticism  of  the  Kuhnian  approach  is  that  it  does  not  fit 
appropriately to the history of economic thought. For instance,  M. Bronfenbrenner (1971) 
believes that Kuhn’s  ideas about the destruction of a theory and its replacement by another 
one has not been the case in economics. Furthermore, he does not see the crisis of the 
discipline as a cause of the emergence of new theories. In the same spirit,  Weintraub (1979) 
believes  that  Kuhn's  account  of  scientific  revolutions  and  the  rise  and  fall  of  different 
paradigms, is not a correct way to approach the history of economic thought. Weintraub 
views the history of economics more as a continuing accumulation of knowledge. Glass and 
Johnson  (1989,  pp.  112-170)  after  discussing  orthodox  and  Marxist  economics  view    11
economics  as being characterized by competing research programmes rather than by one 
paradigm. 
Hausman engages in a more substantial criticism. He states (1994, p. 199): 
“Kuhn’s account of disciplinary matrices provides a checklist of what to look for in 
examining  the  large-scale  structures  of  economic  theorizing,  but  the  basic 
principles  of  microeconomics  have a different status and role than do Kuhn’s 
symbolic generalizations. Consequently, economics does not fit his schema very 
well.”  
An example of a symbolic generalization in economics is that agents are self-interested. 
However, selfish agents are fundamental in much of microeconomics but not in all of it 
(Hausman, 1994, p.198). In more general terms, Hausman (1992, p. 84) writes: “The basic 
claims of equilibrium theory are not quite symbolic generalizations in Kuhn’s sense, because 
economists are not firmly committed to all of them.”  
  From the above analysis, table 3 presents  the main categories of  criticism exercised 
by historians of economic thought upon Kuhn’s explanation  in relation to  economics. 
 
Table 3 
 
Criticisms on Kuhn’s explanation 
Vagueness    In terminology  Non-appropriateness   for economics 
Stigler, 1969  Bronfenbrener, 1971 
Blaug, 1976  Glass and Johnson, 1989 
Glass and Johnson, 1989  Hausman, 1992, 1994 
Johnson, 1983  Weintraub, 1979 
Redman, 1993   
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IV. The Influence of Imre Lakatos 
Many  philosophers  of  science  consider  Lakatos’s  ideas  as  being  rooted  in 
Popperian concepts and especially in Popper’s falsificationism. Popper’s methodological 
views were and still are very influential among economists and this might be the main 
reason why the influence of Lakatos’ methodology is much stronger among economists 
than Kuhn’s (for a collection of papers discussing  Popper’s influence on economics see 
de Marchi, 1988). Lakatos’ starting idea is that the unit of scientific achievements is not an 
isolated hypothesis but a scientific research program. (MSRP). The “hard core” of this 
programme is a framework of general hypotheses. This hard core would not be falsified by 
followers of that programme. The protective belt which surounds it, contains hypotheses, 
and  observation  statements  which  may  be  falsified.  The  “negative  heuristics”  is  the 
condition that the hard core of the programme remains unchanged. The “positive heuristics 
consists of  a set of suggestions which develop the refutable variants of the research 
programme. The idea of scientific progress  lies in the replacement of degenerating MSRP 
by new progressive one. The new programme  provides for future research and leads to 
the discovery of novel phenomena. (for a much more detailed presentation of  Lakatos’ 
ideas see Lakatos, 1978 and Redman,1993).   
 Many  historians  of  economics    have  accepted  Lakatos’  views  as  important 
conceptual tools for understanding the growth of economic knowledge.
3 De Marchi (1991, 
p. 15) defending the Lakatosian progress type in economics, argued that such a theory is 
a  useful  framework  for  the  understanding  of  the  development  of    economic  ideas. 
Backhouse  (1994,  p.188)  believes  that  Lakatos  provides  a  valuable  starting  point    for 
understanding the growth of economic knowledge.    13
Given  the  greater  popularity  of  Lakatosian  views,  one  can  find  much  more 
applications of Lakatos’ views in economic literature. Such applications took place in two 
different areas in economics. The first is related with the various schools or realms of 
thought in economics and the other with specific economic theories. We shall present such 
attempts in the following pages starting from the schools of economic thought.  
It is widely accepted that the first application of Lakatos’ ideas  to economics can be 
found  in  S.  Latsis’    (1976)  work.    Latsis    identified  hard  core  propositions  and  positive 
heuristics in the scientific programme of  neoclassical economics. Similarly, Remenyi (1979) 
extended Latsis’ work by introducing much more specific characteristics of the hard core and 
by providing additional positive heuristics. The traditional schools of economic thought have 
also been identified as Lakatosian SRP. For instance, O’Brien (1976, pp. 107-9) thinks that 
the Lakatosian programme fits rather well with the Smithian SRP, having a hard core and 
positive heuristics, although it was eventually proved a degenerating one. Similarly,  R. Fisher 
(1986)  discusses  the  marginalist  school  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  Lakatosian  research 
programme. 
4 
Blaug (1975, pp. 400, 412-4)  explores Lakatos’ ideas in relation to the history of 
economic thought arguing  that the Keynesian research programme is a real Lakatosian 
one. He also uses the Lakatosian framework for explaining the quick and wide acceptance 
of Keynesian ideas. 
5 Hands (1985) by counter-arguing  that the Keynesian programme is 
not progressive in the strict sense of Lakatos, forced Blaug to respond and to show (1990) 
that such a programme is rather progressive since such a program could  predict some 
novel facts (Blaug, 1990, pp. 97, 101; 1991, pp. 503-4).
6 In the same spirit, Lipsey (1981) 
argued that Keynesian macroeconomics is still a progressive research programme which 
provides strong predictions with good track record.    14
As in the case of Kuhn, alternative schools have been recognized in Lakatosian 
terms.  A.  W.  Coats    (1976,  pp.  49-50)  identified  the  Institutional  school  as  another 
Lakatosian  programme  in  economics  describing  five    hard  core  propositions  and  four 
positive  heuristics.  Blaug  in  a  paper  (1983),  argued  that  the  programme  of      radical 
economics, although less coherent than the neoclassical one, can also be identified as a 
Lakatosian    SRP.  Brown  (1981)  after  presenting  the  hard  core  propositions  of  the 
Keynesian school of thought, described the main ingredients of a post-Keynesian research 
program. Another MSRP has been identified by Rizzo (1982) and Langlois (1982) with 
reference to an alternative economic approach, namely  the Austrian School of economics. 
Rizzo  and Langlois  described an Austrian programme in the Lakatosian lines having five  
hard core propositions and three positive heuristics. Nightingale (1994) tried to trace a 
Lakatosian program in the recent approach of  evolutionary economics.  He describes its 
five hard core propositions, its  protective belt content and its positive heuristics. Moreover, 
he believes that this programme  is richer than the neoclassical research programme “with 
more  content  to  its  positive  heuristic,  a  less  prescriptive  hard  core,  and  capable  of 
accepting a wider range of auxiliary assumptions within its protective belt for purpose of 
using  it  for  scientific  investigations”  (1994,  p.  248).    The  main  points  of    the  above 
discussion are  presented in  table 4: 
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Table 4 
 
Lakatosian SRP on schools of thought 
Classical  Marginalist   Neoclassical  Keynesian  Austrian 
O’Brien, 1976  Fisher, 1986  Latsis, 1976  Blaug, 1975  Rizzo,1982 
    Remenyi, 1979  1990, 1991  Langlois, 1982 
      Brown, 1981   
      Lipsey,1981   
 
Institutional  Radical  Post-
Keynesian 
Evolutionary  General 
Coats, 1976  Blaug, 1983  Brown, 1981  Nightingale, 
1994 
de Marchi, 1991 
        Backhouse,1994 
 
   
As we mentioned, Lakatos approach is also used by the historians of economics to 
explain the development of specific theories. More specifically, Latsis (1972, pp. 208-212) 
by employing the key  Popperian term of  “situational determinism”, identified  a Lakatosian 
scientific research programme in economics in the neoclassical theory of the firm. More 
specifically,  he  stressed that both the theories of perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition form parts of the same dominant research programme “with one  identifiable 
hard  core,  one  protective  belt  and  one  positive  heuristic”  (1972,  p,  208).  He  also 
suggested that this “neoclassical programme was degenerating” (Ibid., p. 234). Similarly,  
de Marchi (1976)  finds clear indications of a  SRP in international trade theory which is 
based on the work of  Ohlin, Lerner and Samuelson.
7 In the same line, Bensel and Elmslie 
(1992) argue that the generalization of Heckscher- Ohlin- Samuelson which incorporates   16
monopolistic  competition,  qualifies  as  a  progressive  Lakatosian  research  programme.
8 
McGovern (1994) has shown that the modern international trade theory has  progressed in  
a Lakatosian manner.  
Blaug  (1976)    argued  that    the  human  capital  theory  is  developing  in  a    SRP 
fashion. In subsequent work, Blaug (1980, pp. 224-239) reaffirmed  that the neoclassical 
theory of human capital has the basic ingredients of the Lakatosian  programme. He held 
that human capital theory started with the work of T. Schultz in the 1960’s and continued 
with G. Becker. The hard core of  this subprogramme according to Blaug, is defined as: 
“People  spend  on  themselves  in  diverse  ways  not  only  for  the  sake  of  the  present 
enjoyment but also for the sake of future benefits.” (Blaug, 1980, p.225). The protective 
belt  of  the  human  capital  research  programme  is  made  of  the  various  human  capital 
theories (Blaug, 1980, pp.224-239). 
Coats  (1976,  pp.  53-4)  identified  the  marginal  utility  explanation  of  value  as  a 
Lakatosian  programme  consisting  of  eight  hard  core  propositions,  and  five    positive 
heuristics.  Wong (1978, pp. 1-3) has argued that there is a Samuelsonian programme of 
revealed preference theory  and shows it to run in a Popperian rational reconstruction 
approach. Cross (1982) by  making some adjustments in the Lakatosian process, shows 
that  the  development  of  monetarism  could  be  explained  in  the  same  terms.  More 
specifically,  he  argues  (1982,  pp.  336-7)  that  from  1953  until  1973  the  monetarist 
approach  exhibited  increased empirical content, but  from 1973 until 1981 it experienced  
empirical  and  theoretical  degeneration.  In  a  similar  tone,  Maddock    (1984,  1991) 
maintained  that  the  rational  expectations  macroeconomic  program  had developed in a 
Lakatosian  fashion,  starting  at  the  mid  1970s  and  running  until  today.
9  Moreover,  
Backhouse (1991) maintained that a modified Lakatosian programme holds for modern   17
macroeconomics. In a subsequent work (1992),  he suggested not to abandon Lakatos in 
economics but to adopt a modified MSRP “to allow for greater variety of types of research 
programme, retaining its  appraisal criterion intact” (1992, p. 32).
10 
Fulton’s  (1984)  paper    was  an  early  attempt    to  review  some  attempts  at  the 
application of Lakatos’ methodology of SRP. He  argued that notion of MSRP should be 
applied to individual economic theories and not to the entire discipline. Then, he fitted a 
Lakatosian programme to neoclassical production theory (1984, pp. 195-201) showing its 
presuppositions, the content of the hard core beginning  in 1880s and 1990s by J.B.Clark, 
Wicksteed, Wicksell, Walras, Marshall, and others and having as its second stage the  
Hicksian theory of wages and as its third stage Robinson’s critique  of the theory of capital. 
According  to  Fulton,  neoclassical  production  theory  consists  of  three  hard  core 
propositions and four positive heuristics. 
Weintraub (1985a, pp. 25-6; 1985b, pp. 108-113) applies Lakatosian thinking to the 
development  of  the  general  equilibrium  analysis.  He  identifies  the  hard  core  of  this 
programme as well as some positive and negative heuristics. Then, he argued that the 
general  equilibrium  theory  of  the    neo-Walrasian  type  exhibits  the  main    Lakatosian 
properties. In another paper (1988, pp. 214-5)  he additionally  claimed that  this program 
is  empirically  progressive  in  the  Lakatosian  sense  and  presented  its  six  hard  core 
propositions, two  positive heuristics and three negative heuristics.
11  
Vint (1994) used the Lakatosian methodology to show that the classical wage fund 
theory  “had  a  period  of  genesis,  a  period  of  successful  existence  and  a  period  of 
degeneration, refuting and abandonment” (1994, p. 5). Thus, he claimed that the “Lakatosian 
framework can provide the points of departure and analytical tools with which to approach 
many questions in the history of economics in general, and the history of classical  wage   18
theory in particular” (1994, p. 29). He found, explained and documented some specific hard 
core propositions in this theory (1994, pp. 41-2).  
  From the above Lakatosian SRP implications on various specific economic theories 
we can compose  the following table: 
Table 5 
 
Lakatosian SRP on economic theories 
Wage Fund  Intern. Trade  Human Capital  Marginal Utility  Th. of the Firm 
Vint, 1999  de Marchi,1976  Blaug,  1976, 
1980,  
Coats, 1976  Latsis, 1972 
  Bensel&Elmslie, 
1992 
  Wong, 1978   
  McGovern, 1994       
 
 
General Equilibrium  Production 
Function 
Monetarism  Rational 
Expectations 
Weintraub,  1985a, 
1985b, 1988 
Fulton, 1984  Cross, 1982  Maddock,  1984, 
1991 
      Backhouse, 1991 
 
 
 
V. Criticisms of Lakatos 
As far as Lakatosian ideas are concerned, one can argue that given that his views 
have had much more influence among economists, one can also find more detailed criticisms 
over the application of Lakatosian ideas to the growth of economic knowledge. The  more 
general criticism is similar to the one applied to Kuhn and refers to the fact that  Lakatos’ 
ideas  developed  with  main  reference  to  Physics.  Thus,  many  economists  such  as   19
Leijonhufvud  (1976)  and  Hutchison  (1976)  believe  that  the  differences  between  the  two 
disciplines are many and significant. This renders the application of Lakatosian methodology 
to  economics  extremely  problematic.  Apart  from  the  general criticism, there  have been  
specific attacks concerning the  Lakatosian explanation for the advancement of economic 
science: (a)  looseness in hard core propositions; (b)  vagueness in  terminology;  (c)  non-
appropriateness  for  explaining  the  advancement  of  economics,  d)  problems  of empirical 
testing and e) justification for the status quo.  
Let us see now  some of the main criticisms  starting with Maki (1980) who argued 
that    the  Lakatosian  concept  of  “hard  core”  is  too  narrow  to  be  applied  to  economics. 
Similarly, Hoover (1991) argues that the new classical economics cannot be characterized in 
terms of  an invariant set of hard core assumptions. Another  example of relevant criticism is 
taken  by  Hausman  (1994)  in  regard  to  Weintraub’s  (1985a,b)  application  of  Lakatos  to 
general equilibrium theory. Hausman (1992, p. 88; 1994, p. 204) argued that some hard core 
propositions  of  general  equilibrium  theory  have  also  been  accepted  by  members  of 
alternative schools like Marxian and Institutionalist economists. Furthermore, the hard core 
cannot include the assertion that preferences are complete or transitive, because there are 
neo-Walrasian explanations which involve incomplete or intransitive preferences. 
In regard to the second kind of criticism, some historians have attacked the Lakatosian 
framework in the same terms as in the case of Kuhn. Redman (1993), for instance, cites  
works by economists who use Lakatosian terms. As she shows (1993, pp. 144-5) it seems 
that  there  is    confusion  regarding  the  use  of  the  term  “research    programme”.  Even 
supporters  of  the  Lakatosian  approach  admit  that  there  is  still  some  confusion  among 
economists  as  to  the  usage    and  precise  meaning  of  these  terms  (see  e.g.  Glass  and 
Johnson, 1989, and Hands, 1993, p.69).   20
  The third   line of criticism focuses on the view that the adoption of Lakatosian 
methodology  does  not  adequately  explain  the  advancement  of  economics.  More 
specifically, Hands (1984) argued that  since economics lack “crucial experiments”,  the 
Lakatosian growth of economic knowledge process dos not fit well. Given this,  he later  
(1985) argues that a  modified version of  MSRP is needed. In the same paper, he also  
argued against  Blaug’s attempts in  analysing a Keynesian MSRP and against  Weintraub 
for  presenting  a  neo-Walrasian  programme.  More  specifically,  Hands believes that the 
criterion of factual novelty was too rigid to be applied to economics (Hands, 1985, p.7). For 
instance, the success of Keynesian economics was not due to its empirical content but on 
other social factors. Many of the facts that Keynes predicted were already used in the 
construction of the theory (Hands, 1985, p.9). The same view is supported by Caldwell 
who  thinks that some of the facts that Keynes had predicted were false (Caldwell, 1991, 
p.101).      In  a  subsequent    paper    (1990,  p.  70),  Hands  restates  his  view  that    the 
Lakatosian type of scientific progress to be too narrow to be fitted in economics. He also  
re-emphasized  the  weakness  of  economics  to  predict  novel  facts,    a  criterion  held  by 
Lakatos as an important one in appraising rival scientific programmes (1990, p. 78).
12  
Another line of criticism of Lakatosian ideas has to do with the empirical testing of 
theories. It has been argued that economists were very successful in producing theoretical 
but not empirical criticism of theories (de Marchi, 1991, pp.15-17). This means that  non-
empirical criticism has proved to be much more effective than empirical criticism. Lakatos’  
emphasis on predicting and confirming facts proved too narrow for the scope of  criticism 
in economics (see also Shearmur, 1991, p.42). 
Finally, a number of authors have claimed that Lakatosian views have served as a 
justification  for  dominant  theories.  Hands  (1993,  p.68),  for  instance,  maintains  that   21
Lakatosian ideas appeal more to economists because they are “softer” than Popperian 
falsification and also because they can be employed to defend the existing theories and 
practices of economics. In the same spirit, Mirowski (1987, p.296) asserts that Lakatosian 
methods serve basically as a justification of the current scientific status quo. Support for 
the  same  argument  is  also  provided  by  de  Marchi  (1991).  Closer  to  this  view  is 
Backhouse’s idea that economists found Lakatos attractive because the appraisal criterion 
he used was already, perhaps for very good reasons, well established (Backhouse, 1994, 
p.181)
13.  
Although  Lakatos’  approach  seems  to  have  been  the  most  popular  among 
economists, there are signs that a growing number start to have serious reservations. For 
instance, there have been specific criticisms of the Lakatosian approach in a volume edited 
by de Marchi and Blaug (1991) in which a number of theorists expressed doubts concerning 
its application to specific subfields. Some of the criticisms of this volume are the following: 
Bianchi and Moulin (1991) argue that the Lakatosian approach has failed to capture the 
insights from game theory; Morgan (1991) believes that it has failed to account for the decline 
of process analysis of econometrics; Kim (1991) argues that it has failed to solve the Duhem-
Quine  dilemma.  In  more  general  terms,  Steedman  (1991)  argues  that  Lakatosian 
methodology is not very useful in trying to understand the relationships between different 
economic theories. In the same spirit, Salanti (1994) maintains that economic methodologists 
are increasingly dissatisfied with the Lakatosian criteria of theory appraisal. Although as he 
observes, historians of economic thought continue to employ Lakatosian categories.  
  The    recapitulation  of  all  the  above  criticism  exercised  upon  the  Lakatosian 
explanation  is shown in table 6. 
   22
Table 6 
 
Criticisms of Lakatosian  explanations 
Looseness of Hard Core  Vagueness of Terminology  Non-appropriateness  for 
Economics 
Hausman, 1992, 1994  Hands, 1993  Caldwell, 1991 
Hoover, 1992  Glass and Johnson, 1989  Hands, 1984, 1985, 1990 
Maki, 1980  Redman, 1993  Salanti, 1994 
    Steedman, 1991 
 
 
“Justification”  for  current 
status quo  
Problems  of  Empirical 
Testing 
Specific Criticisms 
Backhouse, 1994  de Marchi 1991  Bianchi and Moulin, 1991 
de Marchi , 1991  Shearmur, 1991  de Marchi and Blaug, 1991 
Hands, 1993    Kim, 1991 
Mirowski, 1987    Morgan,1991 
 
 
V. Concluding Comments                          
 
The starting point of this work was the influence of the scientific philosophies of Kuhn 
and Lakatos in economic thought and the main criticisms of the application of their ideas to 
economics. Although the discussion was by no means exhaustive, it enables us to make 
some general observations. The first general observation is that the influence of Lakatos 
seems to be much stronger among economists than that of Kuhn’s. Chronologically, Kuhn’s 
ideas were introduced first in economics in the late 60s and early 70s. In the first few years 
the Kuhnian influence was stronger but it progressively declined. The Lakatosian influence   23
appeared later but as it was pointed out, it was stronger.  The Lakatosian influence also 
diminished with time. 
 The second observation has to do with the appeal of the notion of Kuhnian paradigm. 
It seems that a limited number of economists recognized the Classical and the Neoclassical 
schools of thought as paradigms, but the application of this notion to individual economic 
theories like the theory of the firm or general equilibrium theory was stronger.  More popular 
among economists was the use of the idea of Kuhnian scientific revolutions. In particular, the 
concept of Kuhnian revolution with reference to the Keynesian revolution has been supported 
by many economists. The third point concerns the thrust of the critical attitudes towards 
Kuhn’s  views.  The  vagueness  of  Kuhnian  terminology  and  also  the  appropriateness  of 
Kuhn’s schema for the evolution of economic thought were the two main criticisms.   
The  application  of  the  Lakatosian  notion  of  scientific  research  programmes  to 
economics was the next observation of the discussion. A number of SRP in economics have 
been identified like classical, marginalist, Keynesian, Austrian and other. Furthermore,  there 
are numerous examples of  individual economic theories which have been interpreted as 
Lakatosian SRPs. Human capital theory, the theory of the firm, general equilibrium theory  
and rational expectations theory are some of these examples. As far as the criticism of 
Lakatosian applications to economics are concerned, the main lines were similar to the ones 
that  we  saw  in  the  discussion  of  Kuhn.  In  particular,  economists  were  focusing  on  the 
vagueness of Lakatosian terminology and also the appropriateness for economics. However, 
there were three additional lines of criticisms. The first  had to do with the  basic Lakatosian 
notion of the hard core. A number of economists seem to believe that this notion is too loose   
to be applied to economics. The second criticism had to do with the problematic nature of 
empirical testing in economics. The third line of criticism was more cynical in the sense that   24
some  economists  thought  that  the  Lakatosian  framework  served  only  as  a  defense  of 
dominant economic theories.  
One can argue that in spite of the criticisms the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos have had 
positive effects. The most important  effect was   the stimulus that these ideas gave to the 
study  of  the  growth  of  economic  knowledge.    Indeed,  there  has  been  a  proliferation  of 
economic literature dealing with the structure of economic theories. Attempts to combine the 
two theories in order to synthesize a new one which might fit better to economics, is another 
example of positive effects (e.g. Goodwin, 1980). Furthermore, one can observe some recent 
trends to draw from other more modern philosophers of science (for instance, Pheby (1988) 
attempts to draw from the work of L. Laudan). This leads to the important issue of the 
appropriateness of scientific philosophies for economic thought. Some authors believe that 
economists have the habit of attaching to philosophy of science with a time lag (Rosenberg, 
1986, p.136). As Redman states (1993, p. 143):”…the fascination with Popper, then Kuhn, 
and finally Lakatos represents a simple chronological succession that lags the developments 
in the philosophy of science.”  Our discussion and the recent interest with the work of more 
modern philosophers of science supports the above view.  
Furthermore,  given  that  Kuhn’s  and  Lakatos’  ideas  were  initially  embraced  but 
subsequently criticized by many economists, our discussion also supports the emerging view 
among historians of economics and economic methodologists,  that ideas imported from the 
philosophy of the  Natural sciences seem to be inadequate and rather limiting for economic 
thought (for a review see Zouboulakis, 2001). Thus, it can be argued that other alternative 
models of scientific evaluation might be more appropriate for the case of economics. The 
Science Studies approach, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Cultural history are 
examples of alternative approaches which are  gaining acceptance among economists as   25
modes  of    historical  reconstruction  (see  for  instance,  Amariglio,  1988;  Maki,  1992; 
Backhouse, 1997; Weintraub, 1999; Hands, 1997,2001).  
It seems that the followers of the Kuhnian and Lakatosian explanations in economics 
could  not  respond  in  a  convincing  way  to  the  number  of  criticisms  that  we  saw.  Thus, 
economic methodologists have started to move away from such explanations. This is also 
supported by the fact that in the last few years, the interest of historians of economic thought 
and  methodologists,  concerning  the  ideas  of  Kuhn  and  Lakatos  has  greatly  diminished. 
However, as was observed, a large number of practicing economists continue to use the 
basic outlines of these two philosophies of science. One can interpreter this, as an example 
of persistence to a given theoretical framework or “mumpsimus” as J. Robinson has termed 
this phenomenon. Theories of science which emphasize the role of historical, sociopolitical 
and  cultural  factors  might  offer    explanations  for  this  persistence  (i.e.  Bloor,  1983). 
Furthermore, “mumpsimus” to certain economic theories has been analysed by a number of 
authors  (see  for  instance  Hill  and  Rouse,  1977;  Arouh,  1987).  The  reluctance  of  many 
practicing economists to abandon doubtful methodological approaches might be another  
recent case of  mumpsimus in the field of economics.  
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NOTES 
 
1.  On  the  other  hand,    Bronfenbrenner  (1971)  believed    that  the  three  revolutions  in 
economics (1776, 1871, 1936) took place through a dialectical process and maintained that 
these revolutions could be identified only  by modifying Kuhn’s theory. 
 
2. Pernecky (1992, p. 131) argued that "the Kuhnian model is insufficient in providing an 
explanation for the Keynesian revolution because there is much overlap between the pre-
Keynesian and Keynesian paradigms". 
 
3.The  significant  influence  of  Lakatosian  views  can  also  be  seen  from  their  popularity 
among many econometricians. For instance, Hendry (1993) appeals to Lakatos’ ideas  in 
order  to support his econometric methodology. 
 
4. Rosenberg (1986, p.138) believes that the methodology of scientific research programmes 
“is useful for understanding the rise of marginalism, the Keynesian revolution and the rational 
expectations counter-revolution”. 
 
5. For an argument against Blaug’s interpretation see Fawundu (1991). 
 
6. This  argument was criticized by Caldwell (1991, pp. 101-20). 
 
7. Robbins  (1979, pp. 51-2) agrees that the Lakatosian process could be applied in the 
observations of  Latsis and de Marchi  but also  in other episodes of the history of economic 
thought. However, he questioned  the applicability of such approach “to the development of 
branches of more general theory”, such as  the theories of value and distribution, and of 
economic  growth (Ibid., p. 52). 
 
8.  Hands  (1985, pp. 120-1) argued that such a programme is coming closer to  “a legitimate 
Lakatosian rational reconstruction  of a particular step in the development of an economic 
research program”.    27
 
9.    Klamer  (1984,  p.  286)  in  the  New  Classical  economics  or  the  rational  expectation 
approach recognized an “analysis resembling Lakatos’ positive heuristics”. 
 
10.  Janssen  (1991,  p.  697)  examining  the  microfoundations  and  the  modern 
macroeconomic “schools” argued that neither monetarism nor Keynesianism shared  wide 
or  narrow Lakatosian ingredients. 
 
11.  Salanti  (1991)  and  Backhouse  (1993)  criticized  Weintraub’s  argument  about  the 
significance of the programme of general equilibrium and its relevance with the Lakatosian 
methodology. Similarly, Janssen  commented  (1991, pp. 698-9) that the “general Equilibrium 
analysis” a wider programme than the  neo-Walrasian explored by Weintraub, has no positive 
or  negative heuristics.  
 
12. However Blaug (1990, p. 504) contrary to Hands,  insisted that “Lakatos was quite right 
to highlight the prediction of novel facts” as necessary ingredient of a “better” programme. 
 
13. It has been argued recently that Kuhnian ideas have also provided a shield against 
criticism for mainstream economics (see Fullbrook, 2003). 
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